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Title Doesn't Matter, Does It?: An Analysis
of Kentucky's Property Disposition Law
and Its Treatment of Transmutation
BY RUSSELL W GOFF*
I. INTRODUCTION
magine a successful, young businesswoman, Jane Doe. Jane has
been mramed for two years, working as an accountant, and living
m an average home just outside the city Jane decides one day to
take some money she has been saving and to purchase a new car. She
realizes her husband will be the primary user of the car since she usually
takes the bus to work. In addition, Jane places her husband's name on the
title because of her poor driving record and extremely high insurance rates.
A short time later, the marriage ends m a bitter divorce. The issue is
ownership of the car. Did Jane relinquish her property rights in the car
when her husband was made record owner9 Should title even be considered
in determining to whom the car belongs?
Now picture another young couple, John Smith and his wife. The
couple has been married for a few years when John inherits a sizeable
amount of money from his favorite aunt. John, tired of living m a tiny one-
bedroom apartment, uses the money to place a down payment on a large
house in the country. To avoid probate, John places both his and hIs wife's
names on the title to the home. Within a year of the purchase, the couple
finds that the relationship is over and they file for divorce. Ownership of
the home is contested. Do both spouses share an interest in the house? Has
John forfeited the inherited money that he invested m the home?
Under Kentucky law, title is not determinative of ownership in divorce
proceedings. ' The fact that a party or parties appear as record owner of an
* J.D. expected 2001, Umversity of Kentucky. The author wishes to thank
Louise Everett Graham, Wendell H. Ford Professor of Law, Umversity of
Kentucky, for her guidance m structuring and composing tius Note.
See KY. REV STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 403.190(3) (Michie 1999);
Angel v. Angel, 562 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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asset does not confer property rights upon dissolution.2 Currently, all assets
belonging to married individuals at the time of dissolution are presumed to
be marital property.3 To establish a separate interest in property, a spouse
must show, through clear and convincing evidence, Ins or her non-marital
interest m the property.4 Tis process of demonstrating a separate interest
m what would otherwise be considered marital property is known as
,tracing." s
Hence, m the first hypothetical, the car that Jane purchased will likely
be considered marital property despite her husband's status as record
owner, and she will be awarded an equitable share of that property based
on a number of factors.6 Furthermore, Jane may be able to recover the
money that she earned before marriage and invested in the car.7 In the
second hypothetical, John should be able to set aside as separate property
the contribution made from his inheritance, provided he can produce
evidence of its "non-marital" source.8 Otherwise, the entire asset will be
presumed to be marital property and divided equitably between the parties.9
2 See K.R.S. § 403.190(3); Brosick v. Brosick, 974 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1998).
3 Reeves v. Reeves, 753 S.W.2d 301,302 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).4 See K.RpS. § 403.190(3); Brosick, 974 S.W.2d at 502.
s E.g., Chenault v. Chenault, 799 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Ky. 1990).
6 [The court] shall divide the marital property m just proportions
considering all relevant factors including:
(a) Contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property,
including contribution of a spouse as homemaker,
(b) Value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(c) Duration of the marriage; and
(d) Economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of
property is to become effective, including the desirability of
awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable
periods to the spouse having custody of the children.
K.R.S. § 403.190(1).
7 For the purposes of this chapter, marital property means all property
acquired by either spouse subsequent to the mamage except:
(b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the
marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise,
or descent.
K.R.S. § 403.190(2); see also Chenault v. Chenault, 799 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Ky
1990) (permitting spouse to retain as non-marital property the value of assets
brought to the mamage).
8 Cf. Brunson v. Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
9 See K.R.S. § 403.190(3).
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One must wonder whether tins is the most appropriate approach for
allocating property. Does "tracing" promote the partnership principles of
marriage seemingly embraced in equitable distribution?10 Certainly one
could argue that by taking joint title the owner manifests an intention to
relinquish his claim as sole owner and make the asset the property of the
marital estate." Such a change in the character of property, from non-
marital property to marital property, is known as transmutation. 2
Under transmutation, marital property maybe convertedto non-marital
property, and vice versa.13 This concept is not new; it developed under the
common law 14 Kentucky, however, has yet to clearly determine whether
principles of transmutation remain unchanged after the inception of
equitable distribution. If Kentucky courts decide that common law
transmutation principles still apply, they must then determine how those
principles co-exist with a spouse's ability to trace.
Kentucky clearly continues to recognize transmutation in certain
situations."5 Recent case law demonstrates that the character of property
may be changed through agreement, 6 commingling,17 and interspousal
gift. 8 The courts have not yet determmed, however, whether the character
of property can be transmuted by a change in title.
This Note analyzes Kentucky law regarding transmutation by an
alteration in title. First, the basic principles of transmutation are set forth, o
including the vehicles through which the character of property may be
10 See I. THOMAS OLDHAM, DivORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF
PROPERTY § 3.02[2][c] (1999) (citing Joan M. Krauskopf, A Theory for "Just"
Division of Marital Property in Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REV 165 (1976)); Louise
Everett Graham, Using Formulas to Separate Marital and Nonmarital Property:
A Policy Oriented Approach to the Division of Appreciated Property Upon
Divorce, 73 KY. L.J. 41,42-43 (1984).
"See, e.g., McLean v. McLean, 374 S.E.2d 376,381 (N.C. 1988).
'2 See, e.g., OLDHAM, supra note 10, § 11.01; Kinsey-Geujen v. Geujen, 984
S.W.2d 577 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Lilly v. Lilly, 420 S.E.2d 492 (N.C. Ct. App.
1992).
13 See OLDHAM, supra note 10, § 11.01[1].
14 E.g., Mins v. Mines, 286 S.E.2d 779,784 (N.C. 1982).
11 E.g., Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 935 (Ky. 1990); Bischoff v.
Bischoff, 987 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 175
(1999); O'Neill v. O'Neill, 600 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
16 Gentry, 798 S.W.2d at 934.
17 Bischoff, 987 S.W.2d at 800.
18 O'Neill, 600 S.W.2d at 495.
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changed. 19 Within this discussion the current status of transmutation in
Kentucky law is also briefly discussed. Next, the Note provides a short
history ofthe law regarding transmutation by a change m title (i.e., the "gift
presumption")." This is followed by an explanation of the evolution of
statutorily mandated property distribution in Kentucky." The Note then
analyzes the recognized vehicles of transmutation and their relationship to
the current statutory framework.22 The significance of a change m title
under the laws of certain other states is included to provide examples of
how the common law gift presumption is treated m other jurisdictions.'
Finally, the policy implications of choosing whether to recognize transmu-
tation by a change m title are discussed.24
I. TRANSMUTATION
Transmutation is sunply a change in the characterization of property,
from marital property to non-marital property or vice versa.25 Transmuta-
tion is primarily based upon a spouse's intent to change the character of
property.26 There are a number of ways in which transmutation can occur,
including agreements between spouses,27 commmgllngU interspousal
gifts,29 and changes in title.30
A. Transmutation by Agreement
In Kentucky, as m several other states,31 the character of property may
be changed or transmuted by an interspousal agreement.32 Kentucky's
9See mnfra notes 25-97 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
21 See mnfra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 138-89 and accompanying text.
24 See mfra notes 190-205 and accompanying text.
25 See generally OLDHAM, supra note 10, §§ 11.01-.04.
21Id. § 11.01[2].
27 E.g., Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 934 (Ky. 1990).
2 E.g., Bischoffv. Bischoff, 987 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).29 E.g., O'Neill v. O'Neill, 600 S.W.2d 493,495 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
30 E.g., McLean v. McLean, 374 S.E.2d 376, 382 (N.C. 1988); see also
OLDHAM, supra note 10, § 11.02 (discussing transmutation by change m title).
31 OLDHAM, supra note 10, § 11.04.
32 E.g., Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1990); Gentry, 798
S.W.2d at 935.
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property disposition statute expressly recognizes a spouse's ability to
exclude "by valid agreement" property that may otherwise qualify as
marital property 3 3 Husband and wife may, through agreement, define their
property rights upon dissolution, notwithstanding the statutory scheme of
characterization in Kentucky.r
The issue of transmutation by agreement was addressed in Gentry v.
Gentry.35 The parties, through express agreement, effectively designated
assets acquired after the marriage as "separate property" 36 The parties
further agreed that their house would be deemed marital property,
regardless of non-marital contributions. The court honored their agreed
designations. 38 This ruling clearly illustrates that parties may mandate the
characterization of property through agreement, and they necessarily have
the power to change or transmute property's characterization.
This ability to characterize property also affects the ability to trace.
Transmutation through a valid express agreement may override al
statutorily imposed rights with regard to the disposition of property in
divorce proceedings3 9 This would likelypreclude a spouse's abilityto trace
the property to non-marital assets.4° Thus, transmutation by agreement has
survived equitable distribution, and a spouse's ability to trace does not
override transmutation by agreement.
B. Transmutation by Commingling
Another way that property is transmuted is through "commigling. 4
Commingling occurs where separate property andmarital property become
so "mixed up" or jumbled that they cannot be accurately divided for
33 K.R.S. § 403.190(2)(d) (Michie 1999).
34[A] husband and wife m Kentucky may define by agreement their rights
m each other's property, regardless of any rights which would otherwise
have been excluded or conferred by KRS 403.190. Such agreements,
provided they are otherwise valid contracts, are entitled to enforcement
upon dissolution of the marriage.
Gentry, 798 S.W.2d at 934.
31 Id. at 935 (holding that an agreement to allocate the parties' assets by title is
valid and classifying ajointly titled home as marital property).
36 1d.
37 Id.
38 Id.
31 See id.
4' See id.
41 E.g., Bischoffv. Bischoff, 987 S.W.2d 798 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
characterization. 42 Under Kentucky law, m such a situation the entire
sum will be presumed to be martial property.43 This has the effect of
transmuting the commingled separate property into marital property.
Commingling is likely to be an issue in the disposition of joint bank
accounts and other assets acquired with both marital and separate funds.'
The apparent rationale for commingling is "to punish the spouse who
carelessly mixes separate and marital funds. '" 5 Also, transmutation
arguably furthers the intentions of spouses to share and be treated as a
single unit. 6
Transmutation through commingling appears to be statutorily
mandated in Kentucky.4 The statute provides that all property acquired by
either spouse after marriage and before separation is presumed to be
marital property." To overcome this presumption a spouse must be able to
trace the non-marital share of the property to its non-marital origin.49
When a spouse is unable to accurately trace non-marital property to an
asset in existence at the time of dissolution, the presumption causes the
non-marital share to transmute into marital property. 50 For example, a
husband's disability benefits, although non-marital property, become
marital property when commingled with other marital funds and used to
purchase a home."'
Unless non-marital property can be traced into some asset existing at
the time of the dissolution of the marriage, it is transmuted into marital
property through comminglng.g Transmutation by commmgling certainly
42 See OLDHAM, supra note 10, § 11.03.
43K.R.S. § 403.190(3) (Michie 1999); see also, e.g., Farmer v. Farmer, 506
S.W.2d 109, 112 (Ky. 1974) (holding wife had the burden of tracmg non-marital
contributions to joint bank account m order to exclude the funds from the marital
estate).
44E.g., Bischoff, 987 S.W.2d at 800; Farmer, 506 S.W.2d at 112.
4
1 OLDHAM, supra note 10, § 11.03.
" See Turley v. Turley, 562 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Ky. Ct App. 1978) (Vance, 3.,
concurring).
47See K.R.S. § 403.190(3).
4Id.
41 See, e.g., Farmer, 506 S.W.2d at 112.
'°E.g., Chenaultv. Chenault, 799 S.W.2d 575,578-79 (Ky. 1989); Bischoffv.
Bischoff, 987 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998); Brunson v. Brunson, 569
S.W.2d 173, 176 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
51 Bischoff, 987 S.W.2d at 800.
,2See Chenault, 799 S.W.2d at 578-79; Bischoff, 987 S.W.2d at 800; Brunson,
569 S.W.2d at 176.
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appears to have survived the inception of equitable distribution. The
putative change In character is, however, clearly subject to tracing.53
C. Interspousal Gift
The characterization ofproperty may also be changed through gift.' 4 In
Kentucky, an mterspousal gift becomes the separate property of the
donee.55 The donor of the gift loses both hIs separate and marital interest
m the property.
5 6
Kentucky courts do not, however, automatically consider all purported
gifts to be "gifts" as used m KRS § 403.190.1 Whether a change m
possession between spouses constitutes a gift is a factual determination for
the court.58 Four factors are considered m determining whether an
mterspousal transfer constitutes a gift.59 These factors, as announced in
O'Neill v. O'Neill,' include:
the source of the moneyowith which the "gii?' was purchased, the mtent
of the donor at that time as to mtended use of the property, status of the
marrmage relationslp at the time of the transfer, and whether there was
any valid agreement that the transferred property was to be excluded from
the marital property.6'
In O'Neill, the court determined that jewelry given by the husband to
his wife on Christmas and birthdays did not fall within the designation of
"gift" as contemplated by the statute.62 The court explained its decision by
pointing out that: 1) the property was purchased with marital property,
hence the transfer was merely a change in form; 2) the donor intended the
purchase as an investment, reserving future benefits for the marriage
5 See KLR.S. § 403.190(3); Chenault, 799 S.W.2d at 578-79.
4O'Neill v. O'Neill, 600 S.W.2d493 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); see Ghali v. Ghali,
596 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
11 O'Neill, 600 S.W.2d at 493; see Ghali, 596 S.W.2d at 32.
56 S ee Clark v. Clark 782 S.W.2d 56, 62-63 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990); O'Neill, 600
S.W.2d at 495; Ghali, 596 S.W.2d at 32.
5 O'Neill, 600 S.W.2d at 495-96.
RId. at 495.
59 Id.
60Id. at 493.
61 Id. at 495.
62 Id.
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partnersip; and 3) the transfer took place while the couple was married
and living together.
63
Although courts were not originally clear regarding each factor's
relative importance, the Kentucky Court of Appeals later stated that
"donative intent" is the primary factor to be considered.' In Clark v.
Clark,65 the court ruled that a car given by a husband to his wife on
Christmas constituted a gift.6 The court announcedthat donative intent was
the decisive consideration, but also gave weight to the fact that the donee
was the primary user of the property 67
The above cases demonstrate that tracing does not overcome transmu-
tation by gift." Once the transfer is determined to be a "gift," a donor
spouse likely loses his interest in the asset, regardless of is ability to show
that the property was once his separate property 69 The gift becomes the
separate property of the donee spouse. 0
D. Transmutation by a Change in Title
The most perplexing transmutation questions arise where there is a
change in title. Under the common law a change in title created a presump-
tion that the ownersip of the property had changed.7' When an owner of
separate property changed the title to reflect joint ownership, he was
presumed to have given his spouse one-half interest in the property.7 Of
course, in Kentucky this was limited by the restoration statute.' With the
inception of equitable distribution, however, the significance of title was
diminished greatly, if not completely destroyed.74 These circumstances beg
the question: Should a change in title still create the presumption that
ownership has changed?
There is little doubt that a person may transmute property through a
change in title where he intends a gift to the marital estate.7' Where a
6Id. at 496.
"Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56, 62-63 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
6 Id. at 56.
66d. at 62-63.
67 Id.
6see, e.g., id.
"' See, e.g., id., Ghali v. Ghali, 596 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
70 See Clark, 782 S.W.2d at 62-63.
71 OLDHAM, supra note 10, § 11.01[2].
7 Id.
7 See K.R.S. § 403.060 (Micie 1970) (repealed 1972).
741d § 403.190(3) (Micle 1999).
7 See OLDHAM, supra note 10, § 11.01[2].
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spouse desires to relinquish his claun as the sole owner of certain property,
choosing rather to make the asset the shared property of the marital
partnership, he may change title to the asset effecting Ins gift to the
mamage. This is consistent with Kentucky's treatment of interspousal
gifts.7 The significance to be attributed to change in record ownership
absent evidence of the owner's intent is not as apparent, however.
Transmutation issues often arise where an asset that was once the
separate property of a spouse is subsequently titled to reflect joint
ownership with his or her spouse.' In these situations, there is often a
question of whether the spouse intended to change the character of the
property.
Most courts state that when a spousejointly takes title to a non-marital
asset, the spouse is presumed to have made a gift to the marriage partner-
ship.7" The same is true with regard to non-marital bank accounts where the
name of the non-owning spouse is added as record owner.79 In many states,
the marital gift presumption may be rebutted with evidence of a contrary
intent on the part ofthe owner spouse.80 Other states maintain that a change
in title is conclusive evidence that a gift has been made.1 Still other states
have concluded that equitable distribution statutes destroy any gift
presumption arising from joint title.' These states use tracing to character-
ize the assets, notwithstanding the title designation.
8 3
In many instances there is little doubt that the joint title designation
serves a non-donative purposeY' Lenders may require that an asset
purchased with separate property be titledjointly 85 Property may be taken
underjoint title for probate purposes. 6 Othertimes, owners maybe advised
that the law requires joint title 7 The gift presumption does not seem
appropriate where these or similar non-donative motives exist.
6 See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56, 62-63 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990); Ghali
v. Ghali, 596 S.W.2d 31,32 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
' See, e.g., Kinsey-Geujen v. Geujen, 984 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999); Clark v. Clark, 919 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); McLean v
McLean, 374 S.E.2d 376, 381 (N.C. 1988).
78 OLDHAM, supra note 10, § 11.01[2].
79 Id.
" See zd.
81 Id.
82Id.
83 See id.
4Id.
95 Id.
7Id
87 Id .
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Kentucky case law offers little guidance with regard to transmutation
by change m title. It appears that m certain "interspousal gift" cases, courts
have had the opportunity to address the significance of a change m title but
have chosen not to do so."8 One may argue that the courts' indifference to
record ownershnp indicates that Kentucky does not recognize transmutation
through title change. This area of Kentucky law, however, remains unclear.
Kentucky has several alternatives m dealingwith the common-law "gift
presumption" that arises when a spouse titles his separate propertyjointly.
Kentucky courts may choose to ignore the presumption, giving the change
in title no effect at all.89 This would allow a literal application ofthe statute
and would be consistent with Kentucky's disregard for title in determining
ownership upon dissolution.9° The source of the funds used to purchase the
property would be determinative in the characterization of the property 91
By contrast, a change in title may be given significance in the absence
of a gift presumption. Instead ofpresummg an intent to make a gift, courts
could require some showing of donative intent before concluding a change
in character has occurred. Where a spouse claims that property has been
made a gift to the marital partnership, the spouse may be required to show
that the donor actually intended to make a gift. It seems logical that an
analysis similar to that used in dealing with interspousal gifts should be
employed where a spouse has changed title to an asset, given the rationale
of the gift presumption.9 The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has said that
apurported donor's intent is the key consideration in determining whether
a gift has been made.93 Perhaps the title-changing spouse should have to
intend to relinquish their interest in the property before it is transmuted by
a change in title.
Alternatively, courts may choose to preserve the common law gift
presumption and apply it concurrently with the statutory provisions.94 If the
88 See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56, 62-63 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
19 See OLDHAM, supra note 10, § 11.01[2].
90 See K.R.S. § 403.190(3) (Micle 1999).
9 See, e.g.,Brandenburgv. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981);
see also OLDHAM, supra note 10, § 11.01[2] ("Some courts have concluded that the
adoption of equitable distribution has abolished the presumption of gift from joint
title. In such states, title is disregard [sic]; courts merely consider the type of
consideration used to purchase the property present at the time of divorce."
(footnotes omitted)).
I See infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
91 See Clark, 782 S.W.2d at 62-63.
9 E.g., Kinsey-Geujen v. Geujen, 984 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999);
McLean v. McLean, 374 S.E.2d 376, 381 (N.C. 1988).
[VOL. 89
200D-2001] KENTUCKY'S PROPERTY DISPOSITION LAW
gift presumption is preserved, the courts must determine how it co-exists
with tracing. The presumption may be applied despite a spouse's ability to
trace9 -- where title to separate property is changed to reflect joint
ownership, a spousewouldberequiredto overcome the presumption before
he is able to preserve his separate interest through tracmg.9 Alternatively,
Kentucky may choose to apply a gift presumption that is submissive to
tracing; m other words, the gift presumption could be made subordinate to
tracing.
If tracing is allowed to overcome the gift presumption, however, the
presumption would have little or no effect on the operation of Kentucky's
statute. All property, ifnot shown to be separate, is consideredmarital upon
dissolution.97 A gift presumption would be engulfed by the general marital
property presumption that applies to all property regardless of title.
III. HISTORY
A better understanding of the gift presumption is possible when one is
familiar with its ongms. A closer look at its development allows one to
better advocate its survival or champion its demise.
The gift presumption arose under the common law.9 Under the
common law, title was determinative with regard to ownerslnp.9 Mamage
had virtually no effect on the parties' property rights. 100 Each spouse
accumulated and managed his or her own property and, upon dissolution
of the marriage, each spouse's rights regarding individual assets remained
unchanged.1"' If a spouse held title to property and subsequently changed
the property into jomt title, he was presumed to have made a gift to his
spouse, wnch gave the spouse a one-half interest in the property. 0 2
Similarly, if the spouse used property belonging solely to him in exchange
for property taken in joint title, it was presumed that the other spouse
assumed one-half ownership of the newly acquired property 0 3
The rise of the gift presumption can be explained in two ways. First,
under the "title system," record ownerslp was the prominent considera-
95 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Lawrence, 394 S.E.2d 267 (N.C. Ct App. 1990).
9Id.
97 See Reeves v. Reeves, 753 S.W.2d 301,301-02 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
" OLDHAM, supra note 10, § 11.01[2].
'S ee id. §§ 3.02[l], 11.01[2].
100Id. § 3.02[l].
101 Id.
102 Id. § 11.01[2].
3MId.
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tion m dividing property upon dissolution."° Accordingly, joint title was
strong evidence that the property was held in some form of joint
ownership.
105
Second, the gift presumption likely evolved to combat inequitable
results upon dissolution."° Since record title determined ownership under
the common law "title system," property distribution was often unfairupon
divorce.107 Traditionally, husbands were the breadwinners and wives were
homemakers.0 8 Thus, wives frequently relied solely on their husbands for
acquiring property."' 9 In light of the resulting injustice, courts probably
looked to doctrines such as transmutation to more equitably divide property
m dissolution.' The "gift presumption' provided a vehicle by which to
avoid the harsh results of the "title system." Since property that a husband
acquired and titled in his own name belonged to him,"' one could
reasonably presume that he intended to make a gift to his wife anytime he
included her as record owner.
The "title system" eventually gave way."2 Kentucky altered the
common law rule with its restoration statute, which stated that ownership
rights were determined by the origin of the original source of the financial
contribution."' Where one spouse gamed ownership rights in the other's
" See id. §§ 3.01-3.021], 11.01[2].
"s See id.
" See id. §§ 3.02[2], 11.01[2].
107 Id. § 11.01[2].
" See id. § 3.02[2][a].
'o' See id.
1° See id. § 11.01[2].
' See id. § 3.021].
"' Id. § 3.01 ("Tis 'title' system has been severely criticized, and as a result,
no 'common law' state still applies a pure 'title' approach to property division at
divorce. All of these states now utilize some version of an 'equitable distribution'
approach." (citations omitted)).
,3K.R.S. § 403.060 (Micle 1970) (repealed 1972).
(1) If the wife does not have sufficient estate of her own she may, on a
divorce obtained by her, have such allowance out of that of her husband
as the court considers equitable; but no such allowance shall divest the
husband of the fee simple title to real estate.
(2) Upon final judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, each
party shall be restored all the property, not disposed of at the beginning
of the action, that he or she obtained from or through the other before
or during the marriage and m consideration of the marriage.
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property due to hIs or her marital status, and not in exchange for valuable
consideration, the interest was returned to the other spouse upon dissolu-
tion.
114
In 1970, however, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act was
introduced."l5 The act eventually provided two approaches to property
disposition upon dissolution. 6 Kentucky's statute is similar to Alternative
B, an approach that provides for both marital and separate property.
1 7
Kentucky's version of the property disposition statute was codified at
Kentucky Revised Statutes section 403.190,111 replacing the restoration
statute.
Under Kentucky's equitable distribution statute, all property acquired
by either spouse during the marriage is presumed to be "marital
property "1 9 This property is to be divided equitably between the divorcing
parties. 2 The marital property presumption can be rebutted with clear and
convincing evidence' that the property is exempt under one of the
exceptions listed m the property disposition statute." Notwithstanding the
statutory language, it appears that all property held by either spouse upon
"
4 See Eckhoffv. Eckhoff, 247 S.W.2d 374, 37 (Ky. 1951).
115 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIvORCE ACT § 307 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 159
(1998).
1 6 Id. § 307, 9A U.LA. at 288-89. The earliest draft of the act provided for
both marital and non-marital property. 15 LOUISE E. GRAHAM & HON. JAMES E.
KELLER, KENTUCKYPRACTICE: DOMESTICRELATIONS LAW § 15.3 (2d ed. 1997).
The Act was later amended to provide states a choice between alternative proposals
for disposing of property upon dissolution. Alternative B allows marital property
to be divided, but non-marital property is awarded to the individual owner. See
UNIF. MARRIAGE &DIVORCEACT § 307, Alternative B (1973), 9A U.LA. 288-89
(1998). Kentucky based its statute upon Alternative B, with additional language
included m Kentucky Revised Statutes section 403.190(2)(e), regarding division
of appreciated non-marital property. GRAHAM & KELLER, supra, § 15.3 n.10.
Compare K.R.S. § 403.190 (Michie 1999), with UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT
§ 307, Alternative B (1973), 9A U.LA. 288-89 (1998).
117 Graham, supra note 10, at 43-44. Compare K.R.S. § 403.190, with UNIF
MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307, Alternative B, 9A U.L.A. 288-89.
Is See K.R.S. § 403.190.
"9 Id. § 403.190(3).
'20 Id. § 403.190(1); see, e.g., Hollon v Hollon, 623 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Ky.
1981); Wood v. Wood, 720 S.W.2d 934,935 (Ky. App. 1986).
12 Brosick v. Brosick, 974 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).
2 K.R.S. § 403.190(3).
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dissolution of the marriage is presumed to be marital property 2 A spouse
must establish non-marital interest in property in order to have it excluded
from the marital estate. 24
The statute provides its own mechanism for defeating the marital
property presumption.' 5 A spouse may be awarded non-marital interest in
property if he can show that the property was acquired m one of five ways,
which are enumerated in the statute.2 6 As indicated earlier, proving the
non-marital origin of property is known as "tracing."'27
Tracing, at first glance, appears to be incompatible with the concept of
transmutation. If a spouse can trace the origin of property to preserve any
non-marital interest therein, then the character of the property appears to
never really change at all. Transmutation, however, has not been destroyed
by a spouse's ability to trace, as indicated in cases decided after the
inception of equitable distribution.2 8 Published decisions, however, have
not yet reflected transmutation by change in title.
IV. TRACING AND TRANSMUTATION IN KENTUCKY
The relationsinp between transmutation and tracing is not completely
clear. Certainly, tracing overcomes transmutation that would occurthrough
commingling.2 9 Where a'spouse can trace his separate property into an
asset existing at dissolution he may retain his separate interest.'30 Con-
versely, it appears that transmutation by valid interspousal agreement is
2 See Reeves v. Reeves, 753 S.W.2d 301,302 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) ("Property
is presumed to be marital. The presumption is countered by five exceptions .").
See also Marcum v. Marcum, 779 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Ky. 1989); Brunson v.
Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Turley v. Turley, 562 S.W.2d 665,
668 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
24 See, e.g., Marcum, 779 S.W.2d at 210-11; Brunson, 569 S.W.2d at 176-78;
Turley, 562 S.W.2d at 667-69.
125SeeK.R.S. § 403.190(3) ("The presumption ofmarital property is overcome
by a showing that the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection (2)
of this section.').
'26 See d
17E.g., Chenault v. Chenault, 799 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Ky. 1990).
" See, e.g., Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 935 (Ky. 1990); Bischoffv.
Bischoff, 987 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998); O'Neill v. O'Neill, 600
S.W.2d 493, 495-96 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
29 See Brunson, 569 S.W.2d at 176-77 (awarding Mr. Brunson, as non-marital
property, farms owned at the time of separation that were given to hin as gifts).
130 See id.
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untouched by tracing.'3 An agreement may validly dictate the character of
certain property,"' rendering tracing ineffective.
Transmutation by mterspousal gift probably defeats a donor's ability
to trace a non-marital interest in the property 13 Clearly a spouse loses the
marital interest in property if such property is deemed a gift to the other
spouse. 34 The donor is unable to use tracingto preserve any marital interest
in the gift since, under the statute, tracing is only available to show non-
marital interest in what is otherwise presumed to be marital property 135
If the gift comes from the donor's separate property, however, the
donor may, arguably, be able to trace the gift to its origin to retain the
donor's non-marital interest therein. Still, one must remember that tracing
is usually a device to show non-maritalinterest in what is presumptively
maritalproperty.1 36 Furthermore, courts have consistently discounted the
characterization of property before the gift is made. 137 This judicial
indifference suggests that an interspousal gift becomes the separate
property of the donee regardless of its origin. Therefore, in most cases
transmutation by gift generally overcomes a spouse's ability to trace.
The way in which transmutation by change m title interacts with
tracing is the most perplexing situation. The present status of the doctrine
is left unclear, given the inception of equitable distribution m Kentucky.
The courts have not yet identified the significance of changing title to
separate property to reflect joint ownership.
Whether transmutation survives with equitable distribution is a
question which begs resolution. For instance, one is left to wonder whether
1 See, e.g., Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 945-46 (Ky. 1990);
Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 935 (Ky. 1990).
132 See Gentry, 798 S.W.2d at 935; Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d at 941.
133 It is likely that tramg is never available to preserve a marital interest in
separate property. Tracing is astatutorily created device used to show anon-marital
interest in what is presumed to be marital property. See K.R.S. § 403.190 (Michie
1999); Chenaultv. Chenault, 799 S.W.2d 575,578 (Ky. 1990). Hence, there is little
need to address the use of tracmg to preserve a marital interest in property.
134 See K.R.S. § 403.190; Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56, 62-65 (Ky. Ct. App.
1990).
,35K.R.S. § 403.190. The statute provides that a spouse may preserve separate
property by "showing the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection
(2)," or through tracing. Id. § 403.190(3). However, there is no such provision for
tracing marital property.
136 See id. § 403.190(3).
137 See Clark v..Clark 782 S.W.2d 56, 62-63 (Ky. Ct App. 1990); Ghali v.
Ghali, 596 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
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a spouse who changes title to reflect either joint ownership or sole
ownership by the other spouse relinquishes certain ownership rights in his
or her property Presently, Kentucky case law is not determinative of the
issue.
V TRACING AND TRANSMUTATION IN OTHER JuRIsDICTIONs
Kentucky courts may seek guidance by looking to treatment ofthe issue
in otherjunsdictions. Individualjunsdictions have treated transmutation and
equitable distribution differently. The approaches of three junsdic-
tions-North Carolina, Missouri, and Califorma-provide special insight.
A. North Carolina
UnderNorth Carolina law, an owner of separate property is presumed to
have made a gift of that property when he or she changes title to reflect
ownership by the entirety.138 Clearly, North Carolina retains the gift
presumption in an equitable distribution system. 3 9 The. Supreme Court of
North Carolina has expressly ruled that when separate property is exchanged
for property titled as tenancy by the entirety, a spouse is presumed to have
had donative intent." The court stated that a gift presumption was to be used
in construing the equitable distribution statute.141 This presumption controls
the initial determination of whether a gift has been made; however, this
presumption may be rebutted by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence."'142
North Carolina bases its rule on common-law principles, 4 and recog-
nizes that the gift presumption is consistent with the "partnership ideal"
which underlies its Equitable Distribution Act.' 4 The North Carolina
Supreme Court also noted that the presumption would most likely carry out
the intention of the parties.145 Accordingly, only clear and convincing
evidence of a contrary intent may dispute the gift presumption. 1'
'3 McLean v. McLean, 374 S.E.2d 376,381 (N.C. 1988).
139 See Id. at 378.
140 Id. at 381; see also Lewis v. Lewis, 389 S.E.2d 638, 640 (N.C. Ct. App.
1990) (presuming a gift to the marital estate where separate property is exchanged
for property titled as tenancy by the entirety); Hunt v. Hunt, 355 S.E.2d 519, 522
(N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (same).
141 See McLean, 374 S.E.2d at 381.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 383.
145 Id.
'46Id. at 381.
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North Carolina's gift presumption, however, seems to be narrow in
application. The presumption only applies to real property, notjointly held
personal property. 47 The courts of appeal have consistently refused to
extend the exception beyond transactions involving real property 148
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court did not expressly rule out the
possibility of applying the gift presumption to other types of property, in
McLean v. McLean49 it held that the presumption would only apply to
property "titled by the entireties. 150 Tenancy by the entirety is an estate
that rests "upon the doctrine of the unity ofperson ' 'I15 between husband and
wife, in which "each is deemed to be seized of the whole, and not of.
any undivided portion thereof."1 In North Carolina, estate by entirety
applies only to real property.153
If the gift presumption is not rebutted, the property is governed under
the statute's mterspousal gift provision, which dictates that the property
retains its separate property character "only if such an intention is stated in
the conveyance."'' 4 Thus, the gift presumption is consistent with the
operation of the statute. The presumed change in character is also
consistent with the statutory provision governing an exchange of separate
property for property titled by the entireties. 55 According to the McLean
"I McLean v. McLean, 363 S.E.2d 95, 99 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), affd, 374
S.E.2d 376 (N.C. 1988); Manes v. Hamson-Manes, 338 S.E.2d 815,816 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1986); seeMcLean, 374 S.E.2d at 381; McLeod v. McLeod, 327 S.E.2d 910,
916-17 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Johnson,
346 S.E.2d 430, 440 nA (N.C. 1986).
148E.g., McLeanv. McLean, 363 S.E.2d 95 (N.C. App. 1987), aff'd, 374 S.E.2d
376 (N.C. 1988); Manes, 338 S.E.2d at 816; McLeod, 327 S.E.2d,at 916-17
149 McLean, 374 S.E.2d at 376.
'"
0 Id. at 383; see also Thompson v. Thompson, 377 S.E.2d 767, 768 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1989) (applying gift presumption to real property titled "as entireties
property").
"I Davis v. Bass, 124 S.E. 566,567 (N.C. 1924).
5 Id. at 568.
1 In re Foreclosure of Deed of Trust Recorded m Book 911, at Page 512,
Catawba County Registry, 279 S.E.2d 566, 567-68 (N.C. 1981); see Turlington v.
Lucas, 119 S.E. 366, 367 (N.C. 1923); 41 AM. JUR. 2D, Husband and Wife § 37
(1995).
11 McLean, 374 S.E.2d at 382 (quotingN.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (1987)).
155 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (1999) ("Property acquired in exchange
for separate property shall remain separate property regardless of whether the title
is in the name of the husband or wife or both and shall not be considered to be
marital property unless a contrary intention is expressly stated in the conveyance."
(emphasis added)).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
opinion, when a spouse exchanges separate property for property desig-
nated as tenancy by the entirety, the conveyance evidences an intent to
relinquish his separate interest m the property 156 Taking title in joint
ownership, in other words, is not harmomous with the intent to preserve a
separate property interest.1 In sum, the gift presumption survives equitable
distribution in North Carolina, although it is quite limited in scope.
The gift presumption trumps the ability to trace m North Carolina.15 8
Under North Carolina's "source of funds" analysis, a spouse retains as
separate property any amount contributed, alongwith the passive apprecia-
tion in value.159 This is the equivalent of Kentucky's tracing doctrine. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals has clearly stated, however, that the
"source of the funds" analysis is not applicable until the gift presumption
has been rebutted by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence."' 16 The
ability of a spouse to retain a separate interest m property titled by the
entirety is therefore submissive to the presumption of transmutation.
B. Missourn
In Missouri, the common law "gift presumption" survives as well.161
Missouri courts have held that, when a person adds the name of his or her
spouse to titled property, that person creates the presumption that the
property is a gift to the marital estate.162 A change in title presumptively
transmutes separate property into marital property. 63 Stated differently,
'56 McLean, 374 S.E.2d at 382 (citations omitted); see also Manes v. Harrison-
Manes, 338 S.E.2d 815, 816 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that a conveyance of
separate property in exchange for property titled by the entireties is indicative of
an mtent to surrender non-marital interests); McLeod v. McLeod, 327 S.E.2d 910,
916-17 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (same), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v.
Johnson, 346 S.E.2d 430,440 n.4 (N.C. 1986).
157 McLean, 374 S.E.2d at 382 (citing McLeod, 327 S.E.2d at 918).
158 See, e.g., McLeod, 327 S.E.2d at 916-17
'59 McLean, 363 S.E.3d at 98; see McIver v. McIver, 374 S.E.2d 144, 149-50
(N.C. App. 1988).
16o See McLeod, 327 S.E.2d at 916-17
161 See Kinsey-Geujen v. Geujen, 984 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999);
Woolrdge v. Woolrdge 915 S.W.2d 372, 376-77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Clark v.
Clark, 919 S.W.2d 253,255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); In re Mamage ofJennmgs, 910
S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), Spidle v. Spidle, 853 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993); Stephens v. Stephens, 842 S.W.2d 909,914 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
162 Kinsey-Geujen, 984 S.W.2d at 579.
163 Id.
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where separate property is exchanged for other property, which is titled to
both husband and wife jointly, it is presumed that the property is changed
to marital property by gift to the marital estate) 64 The presumption is
rebuttable only with clear and convincing evidence.'65 The amount of
evidence necessary to rebut the gift presumption is unclear; it appears,
however, that a donor's own words and testimony (that he or she did not
intend a gift) are msufficient. 66
The Missouri gift presumption apparently applies to all property, real
or personal, that is titled jointly 167 Even placing money into a joint bank
account is an act sufficient to give rise to the presumption that the spouse
intended to transmute the property into marital property. 68. This is
distinguished from the North Carolina approach, which applies the gift
presumption to real property only 69
According to Missouri law, separate property retains its status when
exchanged for other property. 170 If, however, a spouse changes title to the
asset to reflectjoint ownership, or exchanges the asset for property he titles
jointly, he loses that separate interest unless he can show that he did not
intend the gift.
71
'4 Tracy v. Tracy, 791 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Corbett v.
Corbett, 728 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
'6 Corbett, 728 S.W.2d at 554; see Tracy, 791 S.W.2d at 926.
" See Smith v. Smith (In re Marriage of Smith), 892 S.W.2d 767 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995); Tracy, 791 S.W.2d at 928-29; f Winter v. Winter 712 S.W.2d 423,
428 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the gift presumption may be rebutted by
self-interested testimony supported by documentation).
167 See, e.g., Kinsey-Geujen, 984 S.W.2d at 579. The Missouri courts have not
qualified their decisions, stating sunply that "[t]he owner's adding aspouse's name
to the property's title creates a presumption." Id. (emphasis added).
'1 Ballay v. Ballay (In re Marriage of Ballay), 924 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Mo. Ct
App. 1996); see Layton v. Layton 724 S.W.2d 657 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
169 Compare Manes v. Harrison-Manes, 338 S.E.2d 815, 816 (N.C. Ct. App.
1986), with In re Mamage ofBallay, 924 S.W.2d at 576.
170 See, e.g., Sprock v. Sprock, 882 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)
(stating that property acquired m exchange for pre-marital property remains the
separate property of the pre-marital owner.).
'7' See, e.g., Kinsey-Geujen, 934 S.W.2d at 579; Clark v. Clark, 919 S.W.2d
253, 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Woolndge v. Woolndge, 915 S.W.2d 372, 376
(Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Jennings v. Jennings (In re Marriage of Jennings), 910
S.W.2d 760,763 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), Spidlev. Spidle; 853 S.W.2d 311,314 (Mo.
Ct App. 1993); Stephens v. Stephens, 842 S.W.2d 909, 914 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(citing Tracy v. Tracy, 791 S.W.2d 924, 926-27 (Mo. Ct App. 1990)).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
C. California
Under California law, a presumption of transmutation by a change in
title is statutorily mandated." The relevant statute provides that for
purposes of property division, property acquired during the marriage in
joint ownership is presumed to be community property.' n Community
property, like marital property, belongs to the marriage entity.174 The
presumption applies to all property held in tenancy in common, joint
tenancy, tenancy by the entirety, or as community property 75 The
presumption is rebuttable only by "[a] clear statement in the deed or other
documentary evidence of title by which the property is acquired that the
property is separate property and not community property"' 6 or "[p]roof
that the parties have made a written agreement that the property is separate
property."1" It is clear, therefore, that some type of writing is required to
rebut the presumption.
The relevant Law Revision Commission Comments'79 clearly state,
with regard to the statute, that the presumption also applies to property
acquired before marriage where title is taken injoint form or as community
property after the parties marry 80 The courts have reached the same
'7 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2581 (West 1994).
173 Id., see also Dom v. Solomon, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 311,312 (Ct App. 1997).
174 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 ("The respective interests of the husband and
wife m community property during continuance of the marriage relation are
present, existing, and equal interests."); see also id. § 2550 (mandating equal
division of community property in the absence of special circumstances). Section
2550 reads in part:
Except upon the written agreement of the parties, or on oral stipulation of
the parties m open court, or as otherwise provided in this division, in a
proceeding for dissolution ofmarrage or for legal separation of the parties,
the court shall, either m its judgment of dissolution of the marriage, in its
judgment of legal separation of the parties, or at a later time if it expressly
reserves jurisdiction to make such a property division, divide the
community estate of the parties equally.
Id.
75 See id. § 2581.
176 Id. § 2581(a).
'IId. § 2581(b).
78 See id. § 2581, id. § 2581 Law Revision Comm'n cmt.
"Id. § 2581 Law Revision Comm'n cmt.
180 Id.
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conclusion."' Separate property is transmuted into community property
when title is changed to reflect joint ownerslp.
Apparently, the gift presumption defeats a spouse's ability to trace a
non-marital interest m an asset to its non-marital origin for purposes of
characterizing that property '82 One Calfforma appellate court ruled that a
husband's separate property funds became community property when
deposited in a joint checking account, despite the fact that he could trace
the funds to their non-marital origin.8 3 Forpracticalpurposes, however, the
effects of the presumption may largely be defeated by reimbursement. 1 4
Upon dissolution, a party will be reimbursed for his separate property
contribution to a community asset to the extent he can trace the source of
Ins contribution. 185 This right to reimbursement is lost where the donor of
the property signs a waiver or a "writing that has the effect of a waiver." '186
Consequently, an asset, although considered community property, is
subject to a spouse's right to reimbursement. Absent a waiver, the spouse
can recover the value of his non-marital contribution.
1 7
Even though Califorma is a community property state, the willingness
to preserve transmutation is conceptually relevant to Kentucky's policy in
construing its equitable distribution statute. According to one Califorma
court, the motive for requiring a writing to rebut the community property
presumption is to promote equitable distribution of marital property in
I Cf Heikes v. Heikes (In re Marriage of Heikes), 899 P.2d 1349, 1351-52
(Cal. 1995).
182 See, e.g., Griffis v. Griffis (In re Mamage of Griffis), 231 Cal. Rptr. 510,
516 (Ct. App. 1986).
183 Id. (finding there was no written agreement that the funds were to remain the
separate property of the husband).
14 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2640 (West 1994).
85 This is clear from section 2640(b), which reads:
In the division of the community property estate under this division, unless
a party has made a written waiver of the right to reimbursement or has
signed a writing that has the effect of a waiver, the party shall be
reimbursed for the party's contributions to the acquisition of the property
to the extent the party traces the contributions to a separate property source.
The amount reimbursed shall be without interest or adjustment for change
in monetary values and shall not exceed the net value of the property at the
time of division.
IML § 2640(b).
186 CAL. FAM. CODE § 2640(b).
'
8 7 See id., Perkal v. Perkal (In re Marriage of Perkal), 250 Cal. Rptr. 296, 298
(CL App. 1988).
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dissolution."'8 This appears to be consistent with the policy furthered by the
Kentuckyproperty distribution system. Still, Califorma has allowedtracing
to effectively defeat the presumption through the right to reinbursement.189
By allowing for reimbursement, the courts have given priority to the
welfare of the individual. The existence of the gift presumption, however,
still provides limited protection to the marriage partnership.
VI. POLICY ARGUMENTS
There are inportant policy considerations to be made in choosing how
to treat the common law "gift presumption." The courts should analyze the
far-reaching consequences of the gift presumption before adopting or
rejecting it. First, applying the gift presumption under equitable distribution
would likelyprove advantageous to non-workng spouses upon dissolution.
Although the traditional gender roles are no longer as common in modem
mamages,' 9° the law may have an interest in protecting those persons who
forego a career to act as a homemaker. The gift presumption would present
another obstacle for the breadwinner spouse who is claiming an asset as his
own separate property, and would increase the likelihood that property
would be subject to division at dissolution.
The gift presumption would also promote the "partnership" ideal
embedded in equitable distribution.191 Application of the presumption
would mean that where separate property becomes titled jointly, the asset
is presumptively considered to be the property of the marriage union.12
This places less emphasis on each spouse's individual advancement and
promotes the welfare of the union. 0
Alternatively, the gift presumption would mean that "family" lands
wouldbecome more susceptible to division upon dissolution. There appears
to be a fairly strong public interest in mamtammg family ownership of
ancestral lands passed down from generation to generation. 93 Where a
'88 Buol v. Buol (In re Marriage of Buol), 705 P.2d 354,361 (Cal. 1985).
189 Cf Heikes v. Heikes (In re Marriage of Heikes), 899 P.2d 1349, 1352-58
(Cal. 1995) (holding that due process considerations barred the application of the
remibursement statute where husband conveyed title to two lots to himself and his
wife mjomt tenancy).
190 See . Thomas Oldham, Is the Concept ofMarital Property Outdated?, 22
I. FAM. L. 263,275-278 (1983).
191 See Krauskopf, supra note 10, at 165-75.
'92 See, e.g., Kinsey-Geujen v. Geujen, 984 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999).
'" See, e.g., Abrams v. Abrams, 516 N.W.2d 348, 351 (S.D. 1994) (In
discussing the award of the marital home, the court noted that "[the home] was not
[VOL. 89
KENTUCKY'S PROPERTY DISPOSITION LAW
spouse's name is added to the title of such family lands, the wife will
presumptively gain a marital interest in the land. All marital property is
subject to equitable division upon dissolution of the mamage. 19' The
spousal owner would likely be required to present some evidence to rebut
the presumption that he intended the gift.' Application of the gift
presumption will therefore increase the likelihood that real property that
has beeA passed through generations of family will be divided and sold, or
even awarded to the non-familial spouse."'
The gift presumption does little to preserve notions of individualism
and personal independence. In order to preserve property that a person
brings to the marriage, that person would have to make efforts to ensure
that his spouse was never added to the title of the asset, or any property
obtained in exchange forthat asset. Maintaining sole record ownersip may
present other problems for a spouse as well. One must remember that there
are legal and financial motives that may compel ajoint title."l A spouse
may, for instance, be unable to obtain a loan or mortgage without adding
his spouse to the title.198 Such restrictions serve as penalties on the spouse
who intends to retain sole ownership. Of course, some states allow the
presumption to be defeated with evidence of a contrary mtent.19 Still, this
is arguably an unnecessary burden to preserving one's own property,
imposed simply because the owner chooses to marry One must question
whether the law should impose a presumption of donative intent where
clearly there is no reason to infer one.
Presuming donative intent on the part of any spouse who allows his or
herproperty to be titledjomtly may also encourage selfishness and distrust
within the marriage. If a change in title is given effect, then disputes are
more likely to arise when new assets are obtained. A spouse may view a
mate who exchanges property for a new asset and takes sole record
ownerslp as selfish and untrusting. If the gift presumption is not applied,
ancestral property for winch there need be serious concern in regard to keeping it
in the family.").
' See K.R.S. § 403.190 (Michie 1999).
1 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 258 l(West 1994); Tray v. Traey, 791 S.W.2d
924, 926 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); McLean v. McLean, 374 S.E.2d 376, 381 (N.C.
1988).
1 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Lawrence, 394 S.E.2d 267,270 (N.C. Ct App. 1990)
("Tihe findings that this property was 'ancestral,' are irrelevant to the issue of
whether this property is marital property.").
117See OLDHAM, supra note 10, § 11.01[2].
"I See, e.g., Mims v. Mins, 286 S.E.2d 779, 787 (N.C. 1982).
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the owner's interest in precluding his spouse's name on the title would be
minimal-the origin of the property would control ownersip without
regard to what the title reflected.200
Application of the gift presumption would likely have a great Impact
on property distribution upon divorce. A change m record title would likely
be an issue with regard to large, valuable assets such as real property and
cars3' Characterizing the assets as marital property will likely greatly
increase the value of the marital estate. The gift presumption would
represent an effort to ensure that these valuable assets are characterized as
marital property
The propriety of giving effect to a change in title in a jurisdiction that
otherwise ignores title designation must also be questioned. Kentucky's
marital property statute expressly disregards title in determining the
characterization of property 20 To presume a change in character due to a
title designation seems to run counter to the spirit of Kentucky's equitable
distribution statute. The statute's disregard of title arguably indicates the
legislature's intent to exclude title from any determination regarding the
disposition of property in divorce. On the other hand, it is the act of
changmgthe title-not the title designation itself-that becomes significant
when applying the gift presumption.
To employ the gift presumption in all cases is to presume donative
intent in anumber of situations in which there clearly is none 3 Rather, the
more reasonable alternative appears to involve discerng the intent of the
purported donor, changing ownership rights in the property only where the
parties so intend. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has said that the
purported donor's intent is the key consideration in determining whether
a gift has been given?' Courts could choose to merely view the change in
title as any other purported gift-m other words, they could analyze the
purported donor's intent0 5 Arguably, the title-changing spouse should be
20 E.g., K.R.S. § 403.190(3) (Michle 1999).
2"' This is the sort of property where ownership is most likely to be represented
by record title. E.g., K.R.S. § 382.100 (Banks-Baldwin 1999); id. § 186.020.
202 K.R.S. § 403.190(3) ("All property acquired by either spouse after the
marrmage and before a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property,
regardless ofwhether title is held individually or by the spouses in someform ofco-
ownership . "(emphasis added)).
0 OLDHAM, supra note 10, § 11.0112].
204 See Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56, 62-63 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
' Cf id. (addressing the characterization of an automobile given to wife by
husband, a situation m which the court could have elected to consider the effect of
the name of the record title holder m its donative intent analysis).
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required to intend relinquishment of any interest in the property before it
is transmuted by a change in title.
CONCLUSION
It appears that in Kentucky the concept oftransmutation is not dead, at
least m instances of commingling, interspousal gifts, and agreement.
2 6
Rather, it seems transmutation survives equitable distribution and tracing
principles stemming from Kentucky's property disposition statute.07
Whether transmutation by change in title and the common law "gift
presumption" survive in Kentucky are unanswered questions. When
addressing the issue, courts should consider the relevant policy consider-
ations and determine how public interests will best be served. There is
certainly support for retaining the common law gift presumption in
conjunction with equitable distribution principles, as found in other
jurisdictions.2 °8 Whether Kentucky chooses to apply the gift presumption
in change in title circumstances is an issue that requires immediate judicial
attention.
2
1 See, e.g., Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 935 (Ky. 1990); Bischoffv.
Bischoff, 987 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998); O'Neill v. O'Neill, 600
S.W.2d 493,495 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
2w K.R.S. § 403.190(3) (providing that a spouse may preserve separate pro-
perty by "showing the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection (2)"
or through tracing).
2 See supra text accompanying notes 138-89.

